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Drawing on data from the Parliamentary Candidates UK project, we profile the
socio-demographic characteristics of parliamentary candidates standing in 2015
and compare elected MPs to previous cohorts since 1979. We argue that the
152015 cohort of candidates largely resembles the archetypal candidate identified
by Durose et al. (2013, Parliamentary Affairs, 66, 246–267). Despite smaller par-
ties’ campaign rhetoric of a ‘new kind of politics’, parties across the spectrum
offer up very similar candidate profiles. We find a narrowing of occupational
backgrounds, with fewer candidates and MPs from manual occupations, and an
20increasing percentage of candidates and MPs with a university education.
Competition across the parties, particularly in terms of the selection of women
and black and minority ethnic (BME) candidates, has positive consequences for
the representativeness of Parliament. However, despite a record number of
women and BME MPs elected, Parliament remains disproportionately white and
25male.
Keywords: Archetypal candidate, Sex, Race/ethnicity, Occupation, Descriptive
representation, Political class
1. Introduction
In the run up to the 2015 general election, Jeremy Paxman argued that the cam-
30paign was a choice ‘between one man who was at primary school with Boris
Johnson and one man who was at secondary school with him – both of whom
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did PPE at Oxford’.1 Paxman’s quip reflects a long-standing debate in political
science around descriptive representation or the extent to which elected represen-
tatives resemble—in terms of sex, race/ethnicity, social class, age and education—
the public they purport to represent. The question ‘who our representatives are’
5remains an important one for British politics, particularly as Britain’s political
class has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism in recent years (Oborne,
2007; Allen and Cairney, 2015), not least in response to the expenses scandal
(Van Heerde-Hudson, 2014).2 Among the public, a growing anti-Westminster
sentiment reflects a view that Britain’s political class has become self-
10perpetuating and elitist (Riddell, 1993) and the occupants of the Westminster
Village are increasingly out of touch, insular, and unable to understand the lives
and concerns of ‘ordinary’ citizens (Hansard Society, 2012).
The political class critique is often tied to debates about descriptive representa-
tion—who is and should be—represented (Lovenduski, 2010; Carnes, 2012;
15Kenny, 2012)? Despite the parties’ efforts to recruit a more diverse group of candi-
dates in recent elections, particularly in terms of race and sex, research has shown
that politicians are increasingly drawn from a narrow, privileged class (Criddle,
2010; Durose et al., 2011). The evidence points to the persistent presence of an ‘ar-
chetypal’ candidate—a white, middle-aged, male from a middle-class background.
20Where candidates do deviate from the norm, they tend to conform to the stereo-
type in other regards, namely in terms of their educational and occupational back-
grounds (Durose et al., 2013).
The aim of this article is not to further the theoretical debate on descriptive
representation, but to empirically examine the social profile of parliamentary
25candidates standing in the 2015 general election, motivated by two key questions.
First, what is the social profile of candidates standing in 2015, and secondly, to
what extent does the 2015 cohort of candidates resemble the archetypal candi-
date? We address these questions in three ways: comparing the social profile (sex,
race, age, educational and occupational background) of who is selected (all candi-
30dates) with who is elected (MPs); comparing the social profile of candidates in
parties’ target seats; and comparing the social profile of the 2015 cohort of MPs
to cohorts since 1979.
The political context of the 2015 general election provides an excellent opportu-
nity to consider the descriptive representation of parliamentary candidates for three
35principal reasons: first, a decline in support for Labour and the Conservatives since
the 1970s (S€arlvik and Crewe, 1983) and the concomitant rise in support for
1The Guardian, ‘http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/apr/28/jeremy-paxman-itv-take-me-out-
never-watches-newsnight’, 28 April 2015.
2This work sits within a larger, comparative literature (see e.g. Borchert and Zeiss, 2003) on the politi-
cal class, with a focus on the UK House of Commons.
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smaller and national parties; secondly, efforts to increase the diversity of parliamen-
tary candidates, particularly by Labour and the Conservatives; and thirdly, concerns
over the rise of career politicians and the professionalisation of politics. We take up
each of these briefly.
5The smaller parties’ challenge to the traditional two-party system did not
emerge overnight. The 2015 election followed on the heels of the first post-WWII
formal coalition, and with the overwhelming majority of polls predicting a hung
Parliament, expectations were that the 2015 outcome would produce a second
peacetime coalition or minority government. In the end, the polls turned out to
10be very poor predictors of the vote in England and of the overall outcome
(Sturgis et al., 2016). And, contrary to historical trends and expectations, the per-
centage of the vote secured by the two main parties, Conservative and Labour, in-
creased from 65.1% in 2010 to 67.2%. However, the collapse of the Liberal
Democrat vote and surges by the Scottish National Party (SNP) and UK
15Independence Party (UKIP) resulted in a greater distribution of the vote share
among the smaller parties, but with significantly different results in terms of
seats.3 Thus, despite a return to majority government in 2015, few would argue
that the landscape of British politics has not shifted markedly.
Some of the electoral appeal of smaller parties—particularly UKIP, SNP and
20Greens—was the result of running on ‘anti-Westminster’, ‘anti-establishment’
platforms offering themselves up as an alternative to ‘business as usual’. But did
the smaller parties offer more than just different policies? But did candidates
from the smaller parties look at all different to candidates from the three main
political parties? Did they increase the diversity of parliamentary candidates or do
25they too conform to the norm of the archetypal politician?
Secondly, the 2015 general election took place among growing debate and
interparty recognition of the under-representation of specific subgroups of the
population in Parliament, particularly women and members of black and minor-
ity ethnic (BME) communities (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Lovenduski, 2010;
30Sobolewska, 2013; Campbell and Childs, 2015). There has been considerable vari-
ation within parties with respect to improving the diversity of their candidates.
The Labour Party has been proactive in this regard through their use of all-
women shortlists (AWS), a form of quota, since 1997. This has resulted in a step-
change for women’s representation in the Parliamentary Labour Party and in the
35Commons more generally. However, since David Cameron’s election as
Conservative Party leader in 2005, the Conservatives have made efforts to secure
3In 2015, the Liberal Democrats secured 7.9% of the vote, UKIP 12.6% and the SNP 4.7%. The majori-
tarian, winner take all system resulted in 56 SNP MPs elected to Westminster, 50 more than in 2010,
making the SNP the third largest party in the House of Commons. UKIP came second in 120 constitu-
encies, but only managed to maintain a single MP, Douglas Carswell.
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significant improvements in the diversity of its benches, albeit through less formal
mechanisms (Childs and Webb, 2012).4
Furthermore, the Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary Representation
(2010) helped to foster an environment where all of the parties represented in
5Westminster have been publicly called to account for the under-representation of
specific social groups (House of Commons, 2010). Arguably there is a consensus
among the Westminster parties that increasing the diversity of the House is a
‘good thing’ (Campbell, 2016), although there is disagreement among the parties
about the mechanisms that should be deployed to achieve the goal (Cairney et al.,
102015).
Finally, the issue of the under-representation of women and members of BME
communities in British politics runs parallel to concerns about the growth of ca-
reer politicians, the professionalisation of politics (Best et al., 2001, Cairney,
2007; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) and the resulting under-representation of mem-
15bers of the working class (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). The decline of working-
class, trade union-backed Labour MPs and aristocratic Conservative MPs has led
to the rise of the career politician (King, 1981; Riddell, 1993, 1995). In the past,
the most prominent career path for MPs was through ‘brokerage’ occupations
such as law and education. These professional occupations provided candidates
20with skills and knowledge as well as local networks, which later facilitated their
entry into politics (Cairney, 2007).
More recently, there has been a rise in ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations as a
path to a political career, for example, working as a parliamentary researcher, spe-
cial advisor, party official or full-time local councillor (Cairney, 2007, p. 214;
25Allen and Cairney, 2015). With established links to politics and particularly to
Westminster, politics-facilitating occupations provide a key route into
Parliament for an increasing number of politicians (Cairney, 2007; Allen, 2013).
However, the majority of candidates are drawn from the middle-class occupa-
tions in the professions (law, medicine, education) and other white-collar back-
30grounds (Norris, 1997; Best and Cotta, 2000; Jun, 2003).
One consequence of the professionalisation of politics then, is the convergence
towards a stereotypical or archetypal candidate (Durose et al., 2013).
Professionalisation has resulted in a lowering in the average age of MPs first en-
tering Parliament, higher levels of educational attainment (especially in subjects
35related to politics) and a narrowing in the previous occupational experience of
4Delivering on David Cameron’s promise to transform the Conservative Party, the Conservative
Central Office drawn up an ‘A-list’; that is, a ‘priority’ list of candidates for selection at open primaries,
Conservative target and safe seats, for the 2010 general election. While not exclusive to women candi-
dates, the A-list comprised a large number of women leading to an increase of 7% in the number of
Conservative womenMPs in 2010.
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candidates. The choice of university, subject of study and early career of young,
aspiring politicians is subject to the links they can establish with the inner circles
of the Westminster village. In this article, we examine the extent to which the
2015 cohort of candidates conforms to the archetypal politician, and whether
5MPs elected in 2015 contribute to a more or less diverse Commons.
2. Data and approach
The data come from the Parliamentary Candidates UK (PCUK) project which
analyses Britain’s changing political class by collecting, among other variables,
data on the socio-demographic profile of candidates and MPs since 1945. We
10profile parliamentary candidates for the 2015 general election for candidates
from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National, Plaid Cymru,
UKIP, Green and Northern Ireland parties.5
Collecting data on candidates is a difficult exercise as there is no single source
of candidate data, either from the regulator (the Electoral Commission), or from
15the political parties themselves. Indeed, given the varying resources and profes-
sionalisation of internal party organisations, there are significant differences
among the parties with respect to knowledge of their own candidates and their
backgrounds. The Equalities Act (2010)6 was an attempt to remedy a gap in the
provision of data with respect to the diversity of parties’ candidates, but by the
202015 general election, formal mechanisms to ensure parties complied failed to
materialise, instead relying on a voluntary approach to releasing selection data
(Kelly andWhite, 2016).
Once elected, however, data for MPs are more readily available, due in large
part to the efforts of the House of Commons Library, academic research (Rush,
251994; Criddle, 2010; Nuffield Election Guides), public affairs (DODs) and public
interest organisations (TheyWorkforYou.com; YourNextMP.com). These data
are limited, however, in terms of the range of variables collected or by their form
(i.e. in hard copy as almanacs or fact books).
To compile the data set we relied on publicly available data from a range of
30sources including local/national newspapers; party, candidate and election-
related websites; social media outlets (Facebook, Twitter); and historical data/
texts. Starting from the point of selection for new candidates or reselection for
MPs standing again, we collated information from the various sources iteratively
building a profile for each candidate as information emerged. Thus, we revisited
5We collect information on independent candidates if they are one of the top two finishers in a
constituency.
6See, for example, Section 106, Equalities Act 2010.
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available data for each candidate several times—before, during and after—the
election campaign.
There are two limitations to reliance on publicly available data, both related to
sources of ‘missingness’ in the data.7 First, there is simply less information on
5candidates from smaller parties in the public domain. This may due to smaller
parties lacking the infrastructure and resources to publicise their candidates (e.g.
via candidate or party websites) or because many candidates from smaller parties
are ‘paper candidates’, that is, candidates selected to ensure a party’s presence on
the ballot but who stand no real chance of winning. Given their surge in electoral
10support in the run up to the short campaign, both UKIP and the Green Party
were keen to stand candidates in each of the 650 Westminster constituencies, but
many of these candidates were selected quite late and with no intention to run a
genuine campaign.
A second source of missingness comes from what candidates choose to put
15into the public domain, and candidates have incentives to make public those at-
tributes deemed more attractive by the electorate. For example, recent research
shows that voters prefer candidates who are local above any other trait (Campbell
and Cowley, 2014). This creates an incentive for candidates to claim local connec-
tions, however tangential, such as a grandmother born in constituency or renting
20accommodation during the campaign to show a ‘local’ address, for example.
Candidates are equally incentivised to hold back information that is not elector-
ally valuable, for example, being a ‘Westminster insider’. Both sources of missing-
ness produce potential biases in our results, which we discuss in Section 3 below.8
We profile candidates standing in 2015 across five key variables—sex, race/eth-
25nicity, education, occupation and age—comparing who is selected (all candidates)
with who is elected (MPs); comparing the social profile of candidates in parties’
target seats; and comparing the social profile of the 2015 cohort of MPs to cohorts
since 1979.9 Sex and race/ethnicity are binary measures. Although a more detailed
7An alternative approach would be to survey candidates and ask explicitly for this information or oth-
erwise use data from confidential surveys, but declining survey response rates mean that effect research
requires both strategies.
8The percentage of missing data for the educational and occupational background of candidates is
higher than that for MPs. We have no missing data for MPs on occupation, but 28% missing for all
candidates from all seven parties. The per cent missing for candidates for education is: school ¼ 65%;
university ¼ 45%; Oxbridge ¼ 50%; the per cent missing for MPs is 11%, 2% and 2%, respectively.
We note that the increased rate of MPs school-type is mainly due to the lack of information for the
new cohort of SNPMPs.
9Our measure of target seats for Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru and the SNP
use two measures: whether there was "10% difference in vote share between the first and second par-
ties (similar to BBC) and whether the party was second in the constituency at the 2010 general election.
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measure of race/ethnicity is preferable, it remains for candidates to self-identify, and
given that few do publicly, the binary measure remains the most valid. We measure
three dimensions of candidates’ educational background: the type of school they at-
tended (state or privately funded), whether they have a university education and
5whether they are graduates of Oxford or Cambridge universities. For the analysis of
candidates’ occupational background, we consider their occupation immediately
prior to election and code it as ‘brokerage’ (e.g. legal profession, civil service), ‘in-
strumental’ (e.g. party official, special advisers (SPADS)), ‘business’ (e.g. private sec-
tor employees or company owners), ‘manual’ and ‘other’ (Cairney, 2007).
103. Analysis
3.1. The social profile of 2015 candidates
In this section, we compare the social profile of candidates across the parties and
by winners and losers. We then disaggregate the data to tell a more nuanced story
about differences between the selected and elected. Table 1 shows the social pro-
15file of 2015 parliamentary candidates by party. Looking across the categories, it is
clear that candidates do not descriptively represent the population they serve in
certain key demographics. Moreover, the profile of candidates from smaller or
‘outsider’ parties do not look measurably different from the main parties, with
some exception for educational background.
20Evidence for a narrowing of the political class can be observed by looking at
the percentage of candidates who are university educated. Overall, 84% of parlia-
mentary candidates were educated to the degree level (or higher), which compa-
res to 30% in the UK population.10 UKIP had the highest percentage of
candidates who did not attend university at 35%, followed by SNP candidates at
2523%. These parties differ from the Conservatives and Labour with 15% and the
Liberal Democrats with just 12% of candidates educated at the degree level.
However, we apply some caution to the UKIP figure as the party fielded a large
number of ‘paper candidates’ in an attempt to contest every constituency in
2015. Many of these candidates had no expectation of winning and many pro-
30vided little to no information about their candidacies.
The marginality measure gives an indication of where a seat may change hands and ‘party second’ al-
lows us to determine whether the party actually stands a chance at winning the seat. For UKIP and
Greens, this criteria does not apply given their results in 2010. Here we used their stated target seats, so
their judgment of whether they are competitive for a seat. Our measure does not pick up three-way
marginals.
10Office of National Statistics; data from 2011 Census. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/local-area-analysis-of-
qualifications-across-england-and-wales/sty-qualification-levels.html.
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But it remains unclear how missing data for UKIP candidates bias our esti-
mates here. Would, for example, complete data show a higher percentage of
UKIP candidates having not attended university, the same percentage or a lower
one? For all candidates for which we do have data, there is small and positive but
5insignificant relationship (r ¼ 0.08) between educational level and constituency
marginality, or no evidence that better educated candidates are in the more com-
petitive constituencies. This is also true in looking at just UKIP candidates. For
UKIP candidates in the party’s target seats, there is a negative but still insignifi-
cant relationship. Thus, it is not clear that missing data is pushing up or down
10our estimates measurably.
With respect to occupational background, just 1% of candidates come from
manual occupations, with few differences across the parties.11 There are party dif-
ferences, however, with respect to ‘other’ and ‘business’ categories, but these
Table 1 The social–demographic profile of 2015 parliamentary candidates by party
All Con Labour Lib Dem SNP UKIP Other
Sex
Female 27 26 34 26 36 13 36
Male 73 74 66 74 64 87 64
Race/ethnicity
Non-white 7 10 8 8 2 7 4
White 93 90 92 92 98 93 96
Education
Non-fee paying 74 57 87 73 94 77 79
Fee-paying 26 43 13 27 6 23 21
No degree 16 15 15 12 23 35 11
University 84 85 85 88 77 65 89
Oxbridge 19 29 18 17 0 6 11
Other 81 71 82 83 100 94 89
Occupation
Business 25 40 13 22 16 40 14
Manual 1 1 2 1 2 2 2
Professions 15 13 19 16 10 12 11
Other 59 47 66 62 72 45 73
Age
18–39 27 24 27 28 26 21 36
40–59 54 63 50 49 61 50 47
60þ 19 12 23 23 12 29 17
Source: PCUK 2015; n ¼ 3190; numbers rounded to nearest percentage.
11The Office of National Statistics does not code for ‘manual occupations’ post 2013, however, break-
ing down occupation type from ONS sources, the percentage of the public in manual occupations in
the UK is significantly higher than 1%. See https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/gor/
2092957698/report.aspx, for example.
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differences are the result of ‘large v. small’ or ‘insider v. outsider’ party differ-
ences. On average, nearly six in ten candidates come from ‘other’ occupations, a
broad category including party/trade union officials and civil servants, but is
higher for the SNP (72%), other parties (73%) and Labour (66%). We also see
5party differences in terms of candidates from backgrounds in business/commerce,
significantly higher for both Conservative and UKIP candidates (40%).
The data in Table 1 also confirm that the archetypal candidate is still very
much in situ as 2015 candidates are predominantly male (73%), white (93%) and
middle-aged (54%). Over half of the 2015 candidates (54%) were aged between
1040 and 59 at the time of election, though this was significantly higher for the
Conservatives (63%) and SNP (61%), but both of whom had the lowest percent-
age of candidates aged 60þ (12%). Again, there are differences across the parties
in terms of the sex and race/ethnicity profile of candidates, but it is not the case
that smaller parties are more representative in this regard. The SNP had the high-
15est percentage of women candidates (36%) of the five main parties we examined,
followed by Labour (34%) and both the Conservatives and Lib Dems with 26%.
UKIP had the lowest percentage, with just 13% female candidates. None of the
parties fielded BME candidates equivalent to the population (13%), although
Conservatives came close with 10%. Even within Scotland where the ethnic mi-
20nority population is just 4%, the SNP fielded 2% BME candidates.
But are there differences in the social profile of candidates who are selected
and who are elected? In other words, are there some social attributes that are
more likely to characterise winners rather than losers? The data in Table 2 suggest
that there are few meaningful differences across sex, race/ethnicity, university ed-
25ucation and occupation, but winners—MPs—are more likely to have attended
fee-paying schools and attended Oxbridge. Winners are also more likely to be
middle-aged (40–59) and losers younger (18–39).
Disaggregating the data, we can get a better sense of which kinds of women
and ethnic minority candidates are selected and elected. Previous research has
30shown that women candidates tend to be older and better educated than their
male counterparts (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu,
2013), particularly as women wait longer to stand for office due to family and car-
ing responsibilities. Our data confirm the latter, but not the former. Women can-
didates (87.4%) were more likely to be university educated than men (82.6%), as
35were women MPs (86.4%) compared to men MPs (81.5%). However, our data
show that women candidates (46.4%) were younger, on average, than their male
counterparts (50.1%).12
12‘Missingness’ for candidate age is ca. 50%, driven largely by ‘paper’ UKIP and Green Party candi-
dates. UKIP’s candidate profile was older and the Green’s was younger, on average. This may affect the
average age for candidates, but it does not affect MP age, where data is complete.
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There are notable party differences in the profile of women candidates. SNP
and UKIP candidates were less likely to have a university degree compared to
women candidates from all other parties and also less likely to have attended
Oxbridge. The two parties also selected a lower percentage of BME women.
5Women candidates are almost exclusively middle class, as defined by their occu-
pation at the time of the election, with Conservative and UKIP women candidates
were more likely to be recruited from business backgrounds.13 And, no more
than 2% of women candidates came from manual occupations for any of the
parties.
10As shown above, women candidates were no less likely to be elected compared
to their male counterparts, but what about for BME women candidates? The data
show that BME women were elected at rates equal to white women and more
likely to be elected compared to BME men. But there are differences among BME
Table 2 The social–demographic profile of 2015 parliamentary MPs (winners) and candidates
(losers)
2015 candidates Losers (candidates) Winners (MPs)
Sex
Female 26 29
Male 74 71
Race/ethnicity
Non-white 8 6
White 92 94
Education
Non-fee paying 78 70
Fee-paying 22 30
No degree 16 17
University 84 83
Oxbridge 14 26
Other 86 74
Occupation
Business 25 26
Manual 1 1
Professions 14 17
Other 60 57
Age
18–39 35 16
40–59 46 64
60þ 19 20
n¼3190
Source: PCUK 2015; numbers rounded to nearest percentage.
13The Nuffield studies use formative occupation as a measure of class; we, however, use occupation at
the time of election as this provides better coverage for candidates/MPs over time.
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candidates in terms of who is selected and elected with regard to educational
background. Attending fee-paying schools, university and Oxbridge is dispropor-
tionately higher for BMEMPs than for BME candidates suggesting some evidence
for Durose et al.’s (2013) ‘acceptable difference’ thesis.
53.2. The social profile of candidates in parties’ target seats
In the previous section, we show that candidates standing in 2015 largely conform
to characteristics of the archetypal candidate, albeit more representative with re-
spect to sex and race/ethnicity. However, a more diverse group of parliamentary
candidates will not impact the social profile of the Commons if diverse candidates
10stand in constituencies where they have little to no chance of winning. Here, we
look at the social profile of candidates in parties’ target seats, analysing similari-
ties and differences across the parties.14
The occupational background of candidates in target and non-target seats dif-
fers across the three main parties.15 Labour and Lib Dems have a higher percent-
15age of candidates from ‘instrumental’ occupational backgrounds, compared to
the Conservatives, and this difference is magnified when we disaggregate by target
seats. As shown in Figure 1, 44% of Lib Dem and 43% of Labour candidates in
target seats come from ‘politics-facilitating’ backgrounds. In contrast, a plurality
of Conservative candidates (44%) come from business and commerce back-
20grounds, with only 18% of candidates in target seats from instrumental occupa-
tions. As for the other occupational categories, percentages remain very similar
across target and non-target seats, but vary by party: Labour and Lib Dems tend
to have a higher percentage of candidates with a non-traditional occupation
(coded as ‘other’) with respect to Conservatives, while all three parties have some-
25what similar percentages of candidates with brokerage occupational
backgrounds.
As shown above, nearly one of five university-educated candidates attended ei-
ther Oxford or Cambridge, but is there any evidence that Oxbridge candidates
stood in parties’ target or winnable seats? As a group, were these candidates ‘priv-
30ileged’ compared to non-Oxbridge contenders?16 The data in Figure 2 show no
consistent privilege for Oxbridge alums. For both Labour and the Conservatives,
a lower percentage of candidates with Oxbridge educations were selected in target
14The data here do not allow us to speak directly to parties’ selection strategies, either national or local;
we observe only the type of seat candidates have been selected in.
15We limit our analysis to the three main parties in Figure 1 due to extensive missing data for UKIP,
Green and SNP candidates.
16We do not compare parties’ university-educated candidates in target and non-target seats as 84% of
candidates are university educated.
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seats than non-target seats. For the Conservatives, 18% of candidates with
Oxbridge degrees were in target seats compared to 30% in non-targets. For
Labour, the figures are 11% and 19%, respectively. However, the opposite was
true for Liberal Democrat and Green Party candidates where a higher percentage
5of Oxbridge alums stood in the parties’ target seats than did not. We interpret the
60% figures for Green candidates with some caution given the small number of
target seats for the party. Turning to the UKIP and the SNP, which have the low-
est percentage of university-educated candidates at 65% and 77%, respectively,
candidates from these two parties were also less likely to have attended Oxbridge
10than candidates from the other parties. Within their target seats, just 7% of UKIP
candidates attended Oxbridge. Under our definition of target seat, none of the 59
Scottish constituencies qualify, but it is interesting to note that not a single SNP
candidate attended Oxbridge—having been educated, almost exclusively—at
Scottish universities.
15Parliamentary candidates with an Oxbridge education are still significantly
over-represented compared to the wider UK population: 19% of candidates have
Oxbridge degrees compared to just 1% of the population. Again, our data do not
allow us to say whether the distribution of Oxbridge-educated candidates is the
result of any kind of articulated strategy by the parties, but in the aggregate there
20is no evidence in 2015 that they were systematically privileged by standing in the
parties’ most winnable seats.
Turning to women’s representation, Labour’s ongoing use of AWS resulted in
the second highest number of women candidates selected overall, but the highest
percentage—by some margin—of women candidates in target seats.17 As shown
25in Table 3, women candidates stood in 52% of Labour’s target seats, followed by
the SNP who selected women in 36% of their 59 seats. The Liberal Democrats
had more than a third of women in their target seats (35%) but their electoral di-
saster left them with just eight male MPs. Historically, the Liberal Democrats
have tended to place men in safer seats than women (Campbell and Lovenduski,
302005; Campbell and Childs, 2010) and this is probably the best explanation for
why the residual Lib Dem MPs are all men. The Conservative Party selected
women in 28% of their target seats, an improvement on their historical record,
but still considerably behind the other parties. UKIP was by far the least equal
party with just 13% women candidates overall and 20% women in their target
35seats.
The 2015 general election was a step-change for ethnic minority representation
in the Commons. There are now 41, or 6% BME MPs, the highest percentage to
date. However, the 2015 increase is a function of the steps taken and strategies
employed in the 2010 general election by parties and candidates alike.
17Winnable seats could be either marginal seats or inherited safe seats.
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1052Sobolewska (2013) argues that the increase in the number of BMEMPs can be at-
tributed to the unusual opportunity structure of the 2010 electoral context. On
the one hand, there was the ‘opportunity’ created by the record number of retir-
ing incumbents and thus a high number of new MPs. On the other hand, the
30three main parties were publicly committed to responding to the challenge of
under-representation (House of Commons, 2010). The Conservatives wanted to
signal a modern party image, while Labour and the Lib Dems wanted to win back
ethnic minority voters.
In 2015, 7% of candidates standing in the 2015 general election were from
35black or minority/ethnic backgrounds. The Conservatives fielded the highest per-
centage of BME candidates (10%), followed by Labour and the Lib Dems (8%),
UKIP (7%) and the SNP (2%). But did 2015 BME candidates stand in unwinna-
ble seats? Research has shown that while the percentage of BME candidates se-
lected has steadily grown, BME candidates are often selected in unwinnable seats.
40Kulich et al.’s (2014) evidence suggests that in the last three UK general elections,
seats contested by ethnic minority candidates were harder to win than those seats
contested by white candidates.
Mirroring our findings for women candidates, the parties differed not only in
the percentage of BME candidates selected, but whether the candidates were
45placed in winnable seats. Table 3 shows that although the Conservatives selected
the highest percentage of BME candidates overall, it was Labour again with a bet-
ter record or BME candidates in target seats: 14% BME candidates stood in
Labour targets compared to 5% for the Conservatives. However, disaggregating
this further, Labour’s BME women were still less likely to be selected in target
50seats (39.1%) compared to BME men (43.8%), but more likely than white
women (36.6%) and white men (25.3%) candidates.
Labour increased their number of BMEMPs from 16 to 23 in 2015, despite per-
forming weaker than projected in pre-election polls, illustrating the importance of
where candidates stand. With just 5% BME candidates in target seats, the
55Conservatives also increased their number of BME MPs in 2015 to 17, up from 11
in the 2010 general election. With the highest percentage of BME candidates over-
all, but the lowest in target seats, how did the Conservatives make such gains? Part
of the reason is their better than expected results, but they also selected candidates
in other winnable seats—safe, Conservative retirement seats—where 7 of 38 retire-
60ment seats were filled by BME candidates. In so doing, they virtually guaranteed
the election of James Cleverley (Braintree), Suella Fernandes (Fareham), Nusrat
Ghani (Wealden), Ranil Jayawardena (Hampshire North East) and Rishi Sunak
(Richmond), all whom enjoyed majorities of more than 30%.18
18Safe retirement seats measured where there is a> 10% difference in vote share between the 2010 first
and second place vote and the party’s incumbent has stood down.
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Taken together, these findings suggest that many of the gains in the diversity
of the Commons in terms of sex and race/ethnicity is a consequence—either ac-
tively or passively—of the party’s selection strategies. Despite these gains, the
Commons remains unrepresentative in terms of race/ethnicity and sex. And
5where candidates do diverge from the norm of the archetypal candidate (Durose
et al., 2013), they conform on other traits, that is, university educated, older and
from a middle-class background. To illustrate, and taking just one possible cut of
‘difference’, of the 7% BME candidates standing in 2015, 67% were male, 89%
have a university degree, 48% were between 40 and 59 years of age and all come
10from a non-manual occupational backgrounds.
3.3. All change in the House? The social profile of MPs since 1979
Finally, we examine how the cohort of MPs elected in 2015 changes the social
profile of the House of Commons. Has the supply of a more diverse pool of
candidates measurably changed the descriptive representation of MPs in
15Parliament? As shown in Figure 3, analysis of the 2015MP cohort shows the
continuation of four key trends with respect to occupational background since
1979. First, a decline in the percentage of MPs from manual backgrounds.
Secondly, a decline in the percentage of MPs from the ‘professions’, for exam-
ple, law, medicine, education, etc. Thirdly, an increase in the percentage of
20MPs with backgrounds in business/commerce, which maps onto the
Conservative Party’s electoral fortunes: a small increase from 1979 with
Thatcher’s triumph over Callaghan; a measurable decline in 1997 with Blair’s
New Labour win; and an increase in 2010 with the Conservative’s in Coalition
with the Liberal Democrats.
25Fourthly, we see a significant jump in the percentage of MPs from ‘other’ oc-
cupational backgrounds. Although this increase reflects a trend since 1979, we ap-
ply some caution in interpreting this data. For purposes of historical comparison,
our data have been coded to match the MP data by party from McGuinness
(2010), which means that occupations that do not fall neatly into the manual,
30profession and business/commerce categories, we have coded as ‘other’. One con-
sequence is that this category may be artificially inflated, but more substantively,
we expect some of the increase in the ‘other’ category may also reflect the trend
for MPs from ‘instrumental’ occupations or previous jobs with direct links to
politics (e.g. SPADs, parliamentary researchers, party officials, political re-
35searchers etc.) (Cairney, 2007). We also use measure occupation at the time of
election, rather than formative occupation, which may be reflected in the figures
for ‘instrumental’ occupations.
Figure 4 compares the educational background of Conservative, Labour and
Liberal Democrat MPs and shows how the 2015 cohort of MPs reflects trends
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since 1979.19 First, the notable decline in the percentage of MPs attending fee-
paying schools, particularly for Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs. In 1979,
73% of Conservative MPs attended fee-paying schools; by 2015, only 46% of MPs
had. The Lib Dems have experienced a similar decline, now with just one of their
5eight MPs having attended a fee-paying school (Nick Clegg). The percentage of
Labour MPs attending fee-paying schools has remained relatively constant, but
decreasing from 18% in 1979 to 14% in 2015.
Secondly, across all three main parties the percentage of university-educated
MPs has increased markedly. In 2015, 84% of MPs were university educated, an
10increase on the six in ten MPs from the 1980s.20 This change is most dramatic for
Labour and the Liberal Democrat parties, both for whom had less than 60% of
MPs with university educations in 1979, rising to well over 80% by 2015. And
thirdly, the percentage of MPs who attended Oxbridge has also steadily declined.
The drop in the percentage of MPs attending Oxbridge universities, from a high
15of 51% in 1997 to 26% in 2015, reflects changes in the social profile Conservative
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Figure 3. MP occupation prior to election, 1979–2015.
19Historical data are available only for Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs (McGuinness,
2010, House of Commons Library).
20Recent evidence showing that top jobs in Britain—in politics, the courts and the boardroom—are
held by an Oxbridge-educated elite (Kirby 2016). This is particularly true for the Cabinet level posi-
tions (Van Heerde-Hudson et al., 2015), rendering politicians subject to charges of elitism that limit
diversity for the top jobs and is unrepresentative of the wider public (Riddell, 1993).
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and Liberal Democrat MPs with the percentage of Labour MPs with Oxbridge ed-
ucations holding constant over the period.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of women MPs from 1979 to 2015. As illus-
trated above, the parties’ efforts to increase the percentage of women selected,
5and in winnable seats, has resulted in a significant increase in the percentage of
women in the House, rising from 22% in 2010 to 29% in 2015. The Conservative
Party increased the percentage of women on their benches from 16% to 21%, but
the overall increase in women MPs was largely driven by Labour and the SNP,
where the percentage of women in the parliamentary party increased from 31%
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Figure 4. MP education by party, 1979–2015.
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to 43% and from 0% to 36%, respectively. As shown above, Labour’s continued
use of quotas in the form of all-women-shortlists and the high percentage of
women in the party’s target seats, has pushed the party further towards parity in
Labour’s parliamentary party.
5The SNP did not use quotas in 2015, although they have recently voted to al-
low their use in future elections. Their landslide victory resulted in just three seats
in Scotland not in SNP hands, creating an unprecedented situation where some
SNPMPs had not even been party members prior to the referendum campaign in
2014. As such the election provided a unique opportunity for women candidates
10in Scotland to overcome both the incumbency disadvantage and entrenched
party practices that discriminate against them in the rest of the UK (Mackay and
McAllister, 2012).
Figure 6 shows the trend in BME MPs by party over time. Parliament did not
have a single BME MP until 1987, when four were elected, all from the Labour
15Party.21 Nearly two decades later, the number of BME MPs had risen to 15 in
2005, 13 of which were Labour MPs. It was not until Cameron’s election as
Conservative Party leader in December 2005 and his modernising agenda that the
Tories started to take BME candidate recruitment and selection seriously. The
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Figure 5. Percentage of female MPs by party, 1979–2015.
21Post-war BMEMPs; the first ever BMEMP was Dadabhai Naoroji elected in 1892.
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results of both their and Labour’s efforts were made clear in 2010, when 27 BME
MPs were elected, and the Tories increased their BME MPs from 2 in 2005 to 11.
Despite gains in BME representation in 2015, BME MPs make up just 6% of
Parliament but 13% of the British population. To put the gains in perspective, it
5would take double the current number of MPs to achieve a descriptively repre-
sentative Parliament.
Finally, we look at the average age of MPs at election since 1979. Another con-
sequence of a more professionalised Commons is a shift in the age at which MPs
begin their political and parliamentary career. King (1981, p. 263) has shown that
10from 1945 to 1979 the percentage of MPs first elected in their 30s has increased
from 31.4% for the 1945 cohort, rising to 55.8% for the 1979 cohort.
Simultaneously, the percentage of Parliamentarians first elected in their 50s has
steadily declined, particularly since 1955. But have trends towards a younger
Commons continued?
15The data in Tables 4 and 5 cast doubt on the post-war patterns identified
by King (1981). First, the average age of MPs (by cohort) since 1979 has
changed remarkably little. The average age of MPs elected in 2015 is 50.6, com-
pared to 49.6 in 1979, and stayed within a two-year gap throughout the period.
Moreover, the distribution of age across the range also shows little change
20since the late 70s. Turning to new entrants, and figures comparable to King’s,
the data show very little change. The average age of first-elected MPs in 2015
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Figure 6. Percentage of BME MPs by party, 1979–2015.
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is 44 and shows a slow but steady increase from an average age of 41 in 1979.
But the age distribution shows, contra to King (1981), a declining percentage
of MPs are first elected in their 30s: in 1979, 51% of MPs first elected were in
their 30s compared to 31% in 1997 and 28% in 2015. And the percentage of
5MPs first elected in their 50s has grown from 15% in 1979, to 20% in 1997, to
just under 22% in 2015.
The distribution also shows changes at the ends of the age spectrum. The 2015
election saw the largest percentage of younger (7%) and older (8%) MPs first
elected, the latter the largest since 1945. At the younger end, Mhairi Black, a then
1020-year old politics student, defeated one of Labour’s most senior figures,
Douglas Alexander, becoming the youngest Member of Parliament in the modern
era (Hawkins et al., 2015). Labour also has the four eldest MPs in its rank: 85-
year old Gerald Kaufman, the ‘Father of the House’ and Dennis Skinner, David
Table 4 Average age of MPs by cohort, 1979–2015
Election year Average
age of allMPs
18–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 701
1979 49.6 4 16 27 32 13 3
1983 48.8 1 15 30 26 12 1
1987 49.0 1 16 36 29 12 1
1992 50.0 2 11 34 26 13 <1
1997 49.3 <1 8 28 29 11 1
2001 50.3 <1 11 34 39 14 2
2005 51.2 <1 12 27 38 15 2
2010 49.9 2 16 30 33 17 3
2015 50.6 2 13 32 33 16 4
Table 5 Average age of new/first-elected MPs, 1979–2015
Election year Average age of newMPs 18–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 701
1979 41.2 3 51 28 15 3 0
1983 39.8 5 46 41 8 0 0
1987 41.2 2 42 44 11 2 0
1992 42.7 0 33 52 14 1 0
1997 43.5 2 31 46 20 1 0
2001 42.5 0 43 38 17 2 0
2005 42.2 2 42 37 18 1 0
2010 42.9 4 36 36 20 4 0
2015 43.9 7 28 36 22 8 0
Source: McGuinness (2010); PCUK 2015; age distribution rounded to nearest percentage.
All Change in the House 21
Winnick and Paul Flynn also re-elected in their 80s. Despite changes at the
‘poles’, the 2015 data suggest that trends towards younger cohorts entering poli-
tics have been disrupted and that the Commons remains very much an institu-
tion dominated by the middle-aged.
54. Conclusions
Did the 2015 election provide a significant shake up in terms of who our repre-
sentatives are, or did the 2015 election result in ‘more of the same’? In several re-
spects, the 2015 general election produced a more representative Parliament and
two new records—there are now more women and BME MPs in the Commons
10than ever before. The gains were due in part to the record number of women and
BME candidates standing in 2015, and importantly, where they stood—that is, in
parties’ target or winnable seats. While Labour had the highest percentage of
women and BME candidates in their target seats, the number of SNP women and
BME Conservative candidates in ‘winnable’ seats all contributed to the significant
15change we see in the Commons today.
Despite these gains in diversity, we see evidence of a narrowing of backgrounds
across other social factors. MPs elected in 2015 were less likely to attend fee-
paying schools or to have attended Oxbridge, but 84% of MPs have university de-
grees, indicating a first degree is becoming a prerequisite to entry to the
20Commons. Moreover, the average (middle) age of MPs has changed little over
the years and MPs are predominantly drawn from middle-class occupations.
Changes and new records aside, the socio-demographic profile of the new
Parliament is not significantly different, the archetypal MP continues to dominate
the Commons.
25Did the small parties make a difference? Did they offer up a different, more
diverse profile of candidates? In terms of women the SNP certainly contributed
to the increase in the number of women in the Commons, but in terms of
members of BME communities, the SNP did not offer a more diverse slate of
candidates than the two largest parties. In other respects, SNP candidates and
30MPs were not dissimilar from those from the larger parties. What of UKIP?
UKIP’s candidates were disproportionately white and male, but according to
their own standards of representation (which do not give much priority to
these two demographics), they were more like the general British public with
fewer university-educated candidates standing. The typical UKIP candidate has
35a great deal in common with the typical UKIP voter (Ford and Goodwin,
2014), but the first-past-the-post electoral system means that despite their
strong electoral showing, they did not have the opportunity to change who sits
on the House of Commons benches. Thus, small differences in the candidate
profiles offered up by the smaller parties reinforces Durose et al.’s (2013)
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notion of acceptable difference—that is—although candidates do diverge from
the archetypal candidate on some factors, they conform on most others. This
is true of both the larger and smaller parties.
Our efforts to document the socio-demographic profile of candidates and
5MPs in the Commons overtime point to two important issues going forward.
First, the Equalities Act (2010) has yet to deliver a formal mechanism by which
the political parties can agree to report on candidate diversity, and voluntary
measures have not proved to be a sufficient remedy. And while the Act focuses on
sex and racial/ethnic diversity, it does not expressly require parties report other
10factors (e.g. educational and occupational background, whether a candidate is
from the local area), necessary in understanding the changing social profile of
candidates/MPs. And, importantly, while some parties may be in a position to
provide such data, others are not, quite simply lacking the resources and/or
organisational capacity within the party.
15Secondly and related, the lack of available data from the parties or otherwise,
means that efforts to document who is selected and who is elected suffer from
missing data. As we have shown here, missing data is more likely to come from
UKIP and the Greens who fielded their largest number of candidates in 2015, but
many of whom were paper candidates. The consequences of ‘missingness’ is that
20we may under- or over-estimate differences between the traditional and newer
parties. But, it is not clear which direction missing data biases our estimates, or in-
deed if missing data is random or evenly distributed. In other words, would com-
plete data on UKIP candidate’s educational background conform to the general
pattern we see here or result in a higher or lower percentage of university-educated
25candidates? Our approach has been to rely on information that candidates put
into the public domain, which is not without limitations, but other means—for
example, surveying candidates—also suffer from missingness via high rates of
non-response. Going forward, efforts to understand who is selected and elected
would benefit from complete and transparent candidate data and the political
30parties are integral to that effort.
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